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THE ASEAN-CHINA FREE TRADE AREA
(ACFTA): A LEGAL RESPONSE TO CHINA’S
ECONOMIC RISE?
ALYSSA GREENWALD*
INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 2005, a pivotal agreement on trade in goods 1 between
China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations2 (ASEAN)
took effect. The implementation of this free trade agreement marked
the beginning of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (ACFTA),
which is expected to become the world’s largest trading bloc.3 Most
notably, ACFTA will surpass the free trade areas created by the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European
Union (EU) in terms of population. Upon completion, ACFTA will
encompass an economic region with 1.7 billion consumers, a regional
GDP of about $2 trillion, and total annual trade volume of approximately $1.23 trillion.4
ACFTA’s sheer size alone is sufficient to merit further analysis.
When coupled with China’s economic rise and World Trade Organi-
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1. Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China , Nov. 29, 2004, PRC-ASEAN, available at http://www.aseansec.org/16646.htm
(last visited Sep. 30, 2005).
2. ASEAN is a regional organization comprising the ten Southeast Asian Nations: Brunei,
Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vie tnam.
3. Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang, The Logic of China -ASEAN FTA: Economic Statecraft of
“Peaceful Ascendancy”, in CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA : GLOBAL CHANGES AND R EGIONAL
CHALLENGES 17, 26 (Ho Khai Leong & Samuel C.Y. Ku eds., 2005).
4. ASEAN-CHINA EXPERT GROUP ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION, FORGING CLOSER
ASEAN-CHINA ECONOMIC R ELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2 (2001), available at
http://www.aseansec.org/newdata/asean_chi.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
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zation (WTO) accession, ACFTA has the potential to significantly
impact the WTO-led multilateral trade system.5
Most importantly, ACFTA serves as a tangible reminder of
China’s growing influence in East Asia.6 While the rise of China has
prompted significant debate and research, little attention has been
paid to ACFTA, particularly in the legal field. Instead, most of the
scholarship on ACFTA has focused exclusively on economic and
geopolitical issues, despite the fact that creation of a free trade area is
also a legal process.7
Furthermore, one of the greatest impediments to ACFTA’s long term success is ASEAN’s lack of a sufficient legal structure, namely a
capable dispute resolution mechanism. Hence, the success of this
groundbreaking free trade area may depend on whether ASEAN as
an organization undergoes the legal reform necessary for the implementation of ACFTA. A similar question has often been posed with
respect to China and its evolving trade regime: can China undergo
sufficient legal reform to meet its WTO obligations?8 Yet, few studies
have focused on ASEAN and its ability, or lack thereof, to implement
and legally enforce its own trade ambitions.
Thus, this Note will focus on the relatively overlooked issue of
whether ACFTA will succeed despite ASEAN’s nascent legalism. To
provide the fullest understanding of ACFTA, this note will also review the many geopolitical hurdles to ACFTA’s success. A free trade
area of this magnitude involving only developing countries would be
ambitious for any region. In particular, the troubled history of Chi-

5. For a discussion of the relationship between ACFTA and WTO, see generally, Qingjiang Kong, China’s WTO Accession and the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area: The Perspective of
a Chinese Lawyer, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 839 (2004).
6. See Wang, supra note 3, at 17-19.
7. Jeffrey A. Kaplan, ASEAN’s Rubicon: A Dispute Settlement Mechanism for AFTA, 14
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 147, 148 (1996):
Free trade, now closely linked to ASEAN’s economic emergence, has captured the
imagination and enmity of national policymakers and scholars alike. The free trade
debate, however, is typically confined to its economic and geopolitical underpinnings.
Parallel legal developments, crucial to the efficacy of any free trade agreement, are
mainly ignored even though the process of defining a free trade area and eliminating
trade barriers is, in large part, a legal process.
8. See, e.g., Sibao Shen, WTO and China’s Legal System, in WTO AND EAST ASIA: N EW
PERSPECTIVES 267, 268-71 (Mitsuo Matsushita & Dukgeun Ahn eds., 2004) (“Therefore,
China’s accession into the WTO is more than a matter of economic and trade concerns (not just
like Japan and Brazil who have adjusted their social and legal systems to the western style), it is
really a true challenge to China’s current system and her adjustability, especially in the case of
administrative and legal regimes.”).
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nese-ASEAN relations casts significant doubt vis-à-vis the long-term
feasibility of ACFTA.
Part II of this Note will provide some background regarding the
motivations, origins, and current status of ACFTA, and Part III will
examine the history of the Sino-ASEAN relationship since ASEAN’s
formation. Part IV will analyze ASEAN’s current legal structure,
while Part V will discuss ASEAN’s attempt to create an intraASEAN free trade area and the legal institutionalization that has resulted from this initiative. In Part VI, this Note will turn to a discussion of two key geopolitical hurdles to ACFTA’s success: the lack of
cohesion in ASEAN and competition between ASEAN and China.
Finally, Part VII will include some basic remarks about an issue that
should be the focus of future research: ACFTA’s likely effect on the
WTO and other nations with considerable influence in East Asia.
I. ASEAN-CHINA FREE TRADE AREA: MOTIVATIONS,
ORIGINS, AND CURRENT STATUS
A. Motivations
The rise of China has prompted frequent discussion and concern
in the United States.9 Much of this discussion has focused on the future economic and security threat China may pose to the United
States. In contrast, for the ASEAN member states, China’s growing
status as a global power is not a future challenge but a daily reality.10
In particular, the significant growth of Sino-ASEAN trade and
Chinese investment in the ASEAN member states has increased
these nations’ dependence on the emerging superpower.11 This increasing dependence coupled with the security threat that China
poses predominantly in the South China Sea, makes the “China ques-

9. See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria, Does the Future Belong to China?, N EWSWEEK, May 9, 2005,
at 26 (“[China] is a country whose scale dwarfs the United States—1.3 billion people, four times
America’s population. . . . But now the very size and scale that seemed so alluring is beginning
to look ominous. And Americans are wondering whether the ‘China threat’ is nightmarishly
real.”); see also, Robert W. Radtke, China’s “Peaceful Rise” Overshadowing U.S. Influence in
Asia?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 8, 2003, at 9; see generally , R OSS TERRILL , THE
N EW CHINESE EMPIRE: AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE UNITED STATES (2003).
10. Jong Wong, The Rise of China: Challenges for the ASEAN Economies, in CHINA’S
POST-JIANG LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 355, 363 (Jong Wong &
Zheng Yongnian eds., 2002) (“[T]he rise of China’s economy can disrupt its neighboring
economies, especially in the short run. This is particularly so for the ASEAN economies.”).
11. See Wang, supra note 3, at 31 (noting that ASEAN’s total trade with China in 2004
amounted to $78.3 billion).
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tion” a pressing issue for Southeast Asia. As stated by the director of
a leading Southeast Asian research center, “[f]or better or worse, the
rise of China is a development we can ill afford to ignore.”12
However, while China’s economic rise at the end of the Cold
War was viewed primarily as a “threat” by its neighbors and the
United States, China’s continued rise has recently begun to be viewed
more as an opportunity.13 Beijing has worked hard to cultivate such a
view. On several recent occasions, China has suggested to its
neighbors that its own ascendancy would not hurt the region but
would actually provide many benefits.14 For example, when Premier
Wen Jiabao appeared at the 2003 China-ASEAN summit, he argued
that China’s ascendancy should be seen as a “win-win” situation.15
Later, in a visit to Harvard University, the Premier emphasized that
China subscribed to the idea of “heping-jueqi” which literally means
“peaceful rise.”16
Certainly, there are indicators that ASEAN is beginning to view
China’s rise more favorably. At least one scholar has suggested that
the creation of ACFTA symbolizes recognition by the ASEAN states
that China’s burgeoning economy is no longer a threat.17 However,
other scholars have suggested the contrary: ASEAN has pushed
ACFTA because it still views China as a threat and ACFTA is the
most appropriate response.18
Whether or not ACFTA is a response to the China threat, it is
not surprising that ASEAN has supported the creation of this free
trade area. In fact, ASEAN is still trying to fully implement an intra-

12. K. Kesavapany , Forward, DEVELOPING ASEAN -CHINA R ELATIONS: R EALITIES AND
PROSPECTS—A BRIEF R EPORT ON THE ASEAN-CHINA FORUM, at vii (Singapore: Institution
of Southeast Asian Studies 2004).
13. Id. at 4; see also Wang, supra note 3, at 35 (noting that ASEAN member states see
closer integration with China in the form of an FTA as a method of gaining personally from
China’s growing prosperity).
14. See, e.g., Kesavapany, supra note 12, at 4.
15. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China Aiming for a Peaceful Rise, CNN, Feb. 6, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/02/02/willy.column/index.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2005).
16. See Wang, supra note 3, at 32.
17. Kong, supra note 5, at 841-42.
18. See Wang, supra note 3, at 26 (“Size is important, and China towers over each individual ASEAN member and all of them combined . . . . This is why there is a widely accepted view,
expressed by former Singaporean Trade and Industry Minister George Yeo, that an integrated
ASEAN is the only viable response to an economically-rising China.”).
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ASEAN free trade area called “AFTA.”19 From an economic pe rspective, any free trade area provides many benefits to the ASEAN
states as it allows them to “overcome the disadvantage of smallness
by pooling resources and combining markets.”20
China’s motives, however, are less evident.21 As has been suggested, ACFTA may be China’s way of preempting other powers’
dominance of Asia. For example, as Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang suggests, China can use ACFTA to defuse American influence in the region and to:
[C]ultivate goodwill among China’s important neighbours, maintain
peace and security. . .and secure key markets and raw materials
needed for China’s economic security. It is thus a sine qua non of
“peaceful ascendancy” — the fundamental strategy of China’s new
diplomacy for survival and development. 22

B. Origins
The idea of a free trade area between China and ASEAN was
first proposed by Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji at the November 2000
China-ASEAN summit.23 In October 2001, the China-ASEAN Expert Group on Economic Cooperation issued an official report recommending a “WTO-consistent ASEAN-China FTA within ten
years.”24 A month later, at the November 2001 China-ASEAN summit, the relevant leaders endorsed the ideas of the Expert Group and
the negotiation process officially commenced.25 Then, at the Eighth
China-ASEAN Summit in November 2002, the ASEAN leaders and
Chinese Premier Zhu Ronjgi signed the “Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Co-operation” 26 (ACFTA Framework

19. ASEAN’s difficulties in establishing an intra-ASEAN free trade area further discussed
infra at Part V.
20. John Wong & Sarah Chen, China -ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, ASIAN SURV. 507,
508 (2003).
21. See Wang Jiang Yu, The Legal and Policy Considerations of China -ASEAN FTA: The
Impact on the Multilateral Trading System, in CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA : GLOBAL
CHANGES AND R EGIONAL CHALLENGES 42, 43 (Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C.Y. Ku eds.,
2005).
22. Wang, supra note 3, at 34.
23. Wong & Chen, supra note 20, at 507.
24. ASEAN-CHINA EXPERT GROUP ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION, supra note 4, at 36.
25. Wang, supra note 21, at 45.
26. Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China, PRC-ASEAN, Nov.
5, 2002, available at http://www.aseansec.org/13196.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2005) [hereinafter
ACFTA Framework Agreement].
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Agreement). This agreement has served as a roadmap for the development of the free trade area. As laid out in the ACFTA Framework
Agreement, a free trade area covering trade in goods between China
and the original six ASEAN members is to be completed by 2010.27
The remaining four ASEAN members are expected to fully join by
2015.28 The ACFTA Framework Agreement is a groundbreaking
document, for while individual ASEAN members had previously created free trade agreements, ASEAN as an organization had never before made such a pact with an outside nation.
Moreover, the ACFTA Framework Agreement was China’s first
free trade agreement with a foreign nation.29 Since the ACFTA
Framework Agreement, both China and ASEAN have entered into
negotiations with other countries regarding free trade agreements.
C. ACFTA’S Current Status
In January 2004, ACFTA’s “Early Harvest-Programme” (EHP)
commenced. The purpose of the Early Harvest Programme is to facilitate the reduction of tariffs before ACFTA is fully implemented.
One of the most interesting aspects of EHP is that it is almost entirely
one-sided, with China making the immediate concessions. As EHP
has been described, “it allows ASEAN products to be exported to
China at a very concessionary rate so that ASEAN countries can actually get the benefits of a free trade agreement even before the
agreement is realized.”30 In return for China’s concessions to the
ASEAN members under the EHP, China gets some tariff reductions
for certain agricultural products.31
One of the most critical aspects of EHP is that it was negotiated
on a bilateral basis between China and the individual ASEAN me mbers.32 Since the ASEAN members were unable to reach consensus
amongst the mselves, China negotiated individually with each

27. Id. art. 8.
28. Id.
29. Wang Jiang Yu, supra note 21, at 45 (emphasizing that while China has had agreements
with Hong Kong and the other semi-autonomous Chinese territories, never before had China
signed an agreement with an entirely “foreign” nation).
30. Id. at 46 (quoting Malaysia Early Harvest Clause a Way Out for RB, MANILA TIMES,
Apr. 7, 2003).
31. See id. (noting that these agricultural products include meat, fish, fruit, vegetables and
milk).
32. Id. at 47.
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ASEAN member.33 The Philippines was the last country to enter the
EHP, as recently as May 2005.
Another crucial aspect of EHP is that, by granting ASEAN
members access to certain markets not currently open to WTO members, it gives the ASEAN members a “first mover” advantage over
other WTO members.34 In other words, because sectors of the Chinese economy remain closed to foreign companies, the ASEAN
members will benefit as their companies will be the first to enter new
Chinese markets.
II. THE SINO-ASEAN RELATIONSHIP IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
When ASEAN was founded in 1967, the news of its formation
was not well received by China.35 Although the Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN’s founding document, sets forth seven overarching aims
that focus primarily on political and economic cooperation, 36 China
originally viewed ASEAN as a military association with anti-Chinese
aims.37 China’s view of ASEAN as anti-Chinese was not entirely an
overreaction. Indeed, while relations between China and most
Southeast Asian nations had traditionally been benign, they rapidly
declined throughout the 1960s.38 By 1967, the Cold War and specific
Chinese policies had created an aura of distrust between China and
its southern neighbors.39 In particular, Chinese support for communist groups within several Southeast Asian states reinforced Southeast
Asian distrust and suspicion of the PRC.40 Hence, when the Bangkok
Declaration was signed, none of the original five ASEAN me mbers

33. Id.
34. Maghaisvarei Sellakumaran, WTO at the Crossroads and the Road Ahead for ASEAN,
in ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2004-2005 52, 54 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005).
35. K HAW GUAT HOON, AN ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S ATTITUDES TOWARD ASEAN: 19671976 5 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1977) (noting that ASEAN was referred to as a
“counter-revolutionary alliance” and an “instrument of U.S. imperialism”).
36. ASEAN Declaration [Bangkok Declaration], Aug. 8, 1967, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
37. HOON, supra note 35, at 5-6. (“[T]his reactionary association formed in the name of
economic co-operation is a military alliance directly specifically against China.”) (quoting 10
PEKING R EVIEW, Aug. 18, 1967, at 40).
38. See Alice D. Ba, China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21 st-Century Asia , 43
ASIAN SURV. 622, 623 (2003).
39. Id.
40. See JÜRGEN HAACKE, ASEAN’S DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY CULTURE: ORIGINS,
DEVELOPMENT, AND PROSPECTS 113 (2003).
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(Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines) had
normal relations with China.41
However, as the United States’ relations with China began to
improve, ASEAN members became more open to the idea of normalizing relations with China.42 Moreover, with the end of the Cultural
Revolution, China became more interested in forming relationships
with other “third world” countries.43
Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines were the first ASEAN
nations to resume diplomatic relations with China between 1974 and
1975.44 Singapore developed a trade relationship although it did not
officially normalize relations until 1990.45 And although Indonesia
also refused to normalize relations until 1990, it still accepted limited
commercial interaction beginning in 1985 when it signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with China.46 However, this document was intended to be “unofficial” and did not even contain the
names of either country.47 Nevertheless, despite its unofficial and legally -lacking nature, Indonesia’s MOU with China led to the resumption of direct trade between the two countries.48
Meanwhile, as the United States began to withdraw from the region, demonstrated particularly by its minimal response to Vietnam’s
invasion of Cambodia, many ASEAN members recognized the need
to deepen relations with China.49 However, the founding ASEAN
members could not agree on how relations with China should develop.50 As Alice Ba has described, the ASEAN states “differed,
mostly, over whether China or Vie tnam constituted the larger threat

41.
42.
43.
44.

Ba, supra note 38, at 624.
See id.
HOON, supra note 35, at 30.
Chia Siow-Yue, China’s Economic Relations with ASEAN Countries, in ASEAN AND
CHINA : AN EVOLVING R ELATIONSHIP 189, 194-95 (Joyce K. Kallgren et. al. eds., 1988).
45. Id. at 195 (noting that, while Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand established diplomatic tie s with China between 1974-1975, Singapore only had an exchange of commercial re presentatives); see also Ong Keng Yong, Securing a Win-Win Partnership for ASEAN and China ,
in ASEAN-CHINA R ELATIONS: R EALITIES AND PROSPECTS 19, 20 (Saw Swee-Hock et. al. eds.,
2005) (noting that Indonesia, Singapore, and Brunei Darussalam all normalized relations with
China in 1990).
46. Hadi Soesastro, Indonesia-China Relations, in ASEAN AND CHINA : AN EVOLVING
R ELATIONSHIP 217, 219-21 (Joyce K. Kallgren et. al. eds., 1988); see also Ong, supra note 44.
47. Id. at 220.
48. Id.
49. See Ba, supra note 38, at 625.
50. Id. at 625-26.
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to ASEAN security.”51 Nevertheless, as ASEAN fumbled to find a
solution to the Vietnam issue, China viewed closer relations with
ASEAN as a useful step in its process of economic reform.52 Hence,
in 1978, Deng Xiaoping took a tour of Southeast Asia to develop
support for China’s economic reforms.53 Furthermore, between 1970
and 1985, two-way trade between China and ASEAN member nations grew from $0.2 billion to $4.2 billion.54
By 1991, all of the ASEAN members had normalized relations
with China.55 Meanwhile, relations between ASEAN and the United
States were declining.56 While the United States remained ASEAN’s
main extra-regional ally, the ASEAN members began to realize they
might need to find alternative political-security arrangements: “economic growth and growing trade tensions contributed to a greater
willingness to explore alternative arrangements.”57
From the Chinese viewpoint, normalizing relations and increasing cooperation with ASEAN was beneficial as the ASEAN members
provided potential investors and political allies.58 However, even as
economic cooperation was increasing, China consistently rejected efforts at regional military cooperation. The main source of contention
was China’s actions in the South China Sea with respect to the Spratly
Islands.59 This ongoing dispute focuses on a group of islands in the
southern part of the South China Sea which are now claimed by six
nations: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. In 1992, the ASEAN foreign ministers crafted a legal response
to this dilemma by adopting the ASEAN Declaration on the South
China Sea, which emphasized in the Preamble, “the necessity to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South

51. Id. at 625.
52. See Chia Siow-Yue, supra note 44, at 195-96.
53. See Ba, supra note 38, at 626.
54. Chia Siow-Yue, supra note 44, at 207.
55. Ba, supra note 38, at 627.
56. Id. at 627.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 632 (noting that China began to view its relationship with the ASEAN members
as so significant that it actually referred to the re -opening of diplomatic relations with Indonesia
as “a breakthrough progress in China’s diplomatic field”).
59. AMITAV ACHARYA , CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
ASEAN AND THE PROBLEM OF R EGIONAL ORDER 133 (2001) (“The Spratlys dispute is widely
viewed by ASEAN governments as the major ‘flashpoint of conflict’ in post-Cold War Southeast Asia.”).

07_GREENWALD .DOC

202

3/1/2006 12:53 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 16:193

China Sea by peaceful means, without resort to force.”60 Finally, in
2002 after years of negotiation, China’s Vice Foreign Minister Wang
Yi signed an agreement derived from the 1992 Declaration entitled
“Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.”61
Just as ACFTA is considered the economic pillar of Sino-ASEAN relations, this non-binding declaration is considered the security pillar
of this relationship. The Declaration calls on all parties to resolve all
territorial and jurisdictional disputes “by peaceful means.”62
III. THE ROAD TO LEGALISM
A. An Introduction to the “ASEAN Way”
Decision making and lawmaking within ASEAN is conducted
through what is known as the “ASEAN way.” The ASEAN way is
ASEAN’s trademark: a phrase that is used to describe ASEAN’s
unique consensus approach. The ASEAN way is steeped in the history and culture of the region. It is derived from the Malaysian concepts of “musjawarah” and “mufukat.”63 “Musjawarah” refers to the
process of decision-making through consultation and discussion, while
“mufukat” refers to the unanimous decision that is achieved through
musjawarah. As described by Paul Davidson, the ASEAN way:
[I]nvolves processes including intensive informal and discreet discussions behind the scenes to work out a general consensus which
then acts as the starting point around which the unanimous decision
is finally accepted in more formal meetings, rather than across-thetable negotiations involving bargaining and give-and-take that result in deals enforceable in a court of law. 64

Thus, the ASEAN way is fundamental in shaping every aspect of this
regional organization. Not only are meetings conducted through the
consensus approach, but the resulting regulations and agreements reflect this consensus style. Indeed, most ASEAN documents reflect
this kind of “soft” law. Consequently, agreements generally do not
contain many legally-binding provisions but rather consist of a set of
very broad principles.
60. ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea (July 22, 1992), available at
http://www.aseansec.org/1196.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
61. Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (Nov. 4, 2002), PRCASEAN, available at http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
62. Id. art. 4.
63. SHAUN NARINE, EXPLAINING ASEAN: R EGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 31 (2002).
64. Paul J. Davidson, The ASEAN Way and Role of Law in ASEAN Economic Cooperation, 8 S.Y.B.I.L. 165, 167 (2004).
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The ASEAN way may indeed be reflective of an Asia-wide approach to law.65 As Shin-yi Peng describes, “[a]mbiguity is almost an
art form; it is viewed as a useful device in mitigating conflict and
building common positions and confidence. . . Asians tend to avoid
legalism and emphasize group ‘harmony’ and consensus.”66 Hence,
when consensus cannot be reached on a particular issue, the flexible
ASEAN way allows the member states to push aside the controversial
issue so that they can discuss other matters.67 It is likely because of
this flexibility that the organization has been able to survive during
very contentious times.
The ASEAN way can be viewed as a rejection of the formal legalism of international institutions.68 Yet, even the current ASEAN
Secretary-General has suggested that ASEAN needs to reform its legal structure—particularly its economic laws—to bring them more
into line with international norms:
As ASEAN engages in more and more economic cooperation
schemes, both among its own Member Countries and with partners
outside of Southeast Asia, ASEAN has to become increasingly legalistic. Economic agreements have to be implemented with a high
degree of certainty. When disputes arise, there must be some efficient process to settle them amicably and fairly. 69

Thus, while ASEAN has been able to survive without significant legal
institutionalization, ASEAN must undergo legal reform for ACFTA
to succeed. As economic analyst Rajenthran Armugam stated when
discussing the need for ASEAN to create economic laws more in
touch with international norms, “[i]nvariably, failure to do so would
result in erosion of economic comparative and competitive advantage
— thus leading to heavy economic loss.70
Other scholars suggest that the ASEAN states may become more
inclined to embrace legal institutionalization not only because it is
65. Shin-yi Peng, The WTO Legalistic Approach and East Asia: From the Legal Culture
Perspective, 1 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 13, 20 (2000).
66. Id. at 21.
67. N ARINE, supra note 60, at 31:
Within ASEAN, conflicts are dealt with by postponing difficult issues, compartmentalizing an issue so that it does not interfere with other areas of cooperation, and quiet
diplomacy. As a result, ASEAN is not capable of resolving many issues of contention
between its members, but it can move those issues aside so that they do not prevent
progress in other areas.
68. See Davidson, supra note 61, at 167.
69. H.E. Ong Keng Yong, ASEAN and the 3 L’s: Leaders, Laymen, and Lawyers,
http://www.aseansec.org/17356.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2005).
70. Rajenthran Armugam, Revisiting the Law and Development Paradigm in ASEAN,
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2004-2005 59, 61 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005).
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necessary for the sustainability of free trade agreements, but also because the rejection of legalism is not as culturally-based as widely believed.71 As scholar Miles Kahler has argued, “those in ASEAN, reject legalization of regional institutions when it is to their
disadvantage, not because of culturally distinct approaches to legalism.”72
B. The Evolving ASEAN Legal Framework
Beginning with the Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN was predetermined to be non-legalistic. The Declaration itself was only a political statement that required no ratification.73 As the current
ASEAN Secretary-General has described: “[t]he intention was clear:
the Founding Fathers wanted ASEAN to be just a loosely-organized
political association with minimum institutionalization, and without
legal personality or constitutional framework.”74
ASEAN made its first overtures towards developing a more
comprehensive legal framework in 1976, nine years after it was
founded, when the ASEAN member states established the ASEAN
Secretariat.75 Prior to the ASEAN Secretariat, all coordination
among ASEAN states had to occur through the secretariats based in
each member country. In 1993, the ASEAN Secretariat was again restructured.76 Although the ASEAN Secretariat still lacks any real decision-making authority, as described by Paul Davidson, “the evolution of the Secretariat indicates the maturation of ASEAN as an
entity and may be considered as an initial step in formalizing the legal
personality of ASEAN as a corporate entity governed by its own constitution and by -laws.”77
One of the major limitations preventing ASEAN from using a
legalistic approach for economic regulation, specifically free trade
regulation, is ASEAN’s underdeveloped dispute settlement mechanism. ASEAN never even discussed the possibility of a regional dis-

71. N ARINE, supra note 60, at 198.
72. Id.
73. See generally Bangkok Declaration, supra note 36.
74. Ong, supra note 66.
75. The ASEAN Secretariat was created by the Agreement on the Establishment of the
ASEAN Secretariat (Feb. 24, 1976), ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/1265.htm (last visited
Nov. 3, 2005).
76. See Joint Communique of the Twenty-Sixth Asean Ministerial Meeting (July 23-24,
1993), ASEAN, available at http://www.aseansec.org/2009.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2005).
77. Davidson, supra note 61, at 169.
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pute settlement mechanism until nearly ten years after the organiz ation was founded.78 However, in 1976, ASEAN developed such a
mechanism for political disputes with the signing of the Declaration
of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
(Treaty of Amity). Perhaps the most significant provision of the
Treaty of Amity is Article 2(d), which requires the “[s]ettlement of
differences or disputes by peaceful means.”79 Other notable provisions are Articles 14-18, which create a High Council composed of
representatives from the Southeast Asian member states who are responsible for resolving all covered disputes.80
Furthermore, while the Treaty of Amity was originally conceived
as a legally binding code of conduct for the Southeast Asian countries, in 1987, the Treaty of Amity was amended to allow nonASEAN members to accede to the treaty.81 While New Guinea was
the first country to ratify the Treaty of Amity, China was the first of
ASEAN’s major allies to sign this Treaty.82 Currently, key nonASEAN members of the Treaty of Amity are: China, India, Japan,
Pakistan, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Korea, and New
Zealand. Until July 2005, Australia declined the invitation to accede
to the Treaty of Amity because of potential conflicts with an existing
alliance with the United States.83 However, Australia’s refusal to sign
this non-aggression treaty had tangible consequences: until Australia
indicated that it would sign the treaty, ASEAN was not going to allow
it to participate in the first East Asian summit to take place in Kuala
Lampur in December 2005.84 The Treaty of Amity is a noteworthy
legal framework for its role in East Asian cooperation and as the first
legally binding non-economic agreement among ASEAN members.85

78. Id. at 172.
79. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Feb. 24, 1976), ASEAN, art. 2(d),
available at http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
80. Id. arts. 14-18.
81. Protocol Amending the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Dec. 15,
1987), ASEAN, available at http://www.aseansec.org/1218.htm(last visited Nov. 3, 2005).
82. China signed the Treaty at the China-ASEAN Summit in October 2003.
83. Reuters,
Canberra
to
Sign
Asia
Peace
Pact
(July
27,
2005),
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/07/27/australia.summit.reut/index.html.
84. Id.
85. Ong, supra note 69.
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Additionally, in 2001, ASEAN created rules of procedure for the
High Council.86 With the Rules of Procedure, the High Council is
now intended to be a more formalized dispute resolution body that
can hear political disputes as long as both pa rties consent.87
Meanwhile, since 1995, ASEAN has been in the process of developing a dispute resolution mechanism to resolve economic disputes. At the 1995 Bangkok Summit, the ASEAN members agreed
that they would adopt a General Dispute Settlement Mechanism
(“DSM”). As the ASEAN me mbers stressed, the DSM would have
jurisdiction to hear “all disputes arising from ASEAN economic
agreements.”88 A year later, the ASEAN members adopted The Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism (“1996 Protocol”).89 The
Preamble of the 1996 Protocol states that it was created in recognition
of “the need to expand Article 9 of the [Framework] Agreement [on
Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation] to strengthen the
mechanism for the settlement of disputes in the area of ASEAN economic cooperation.”90 The 1996 Protocol was modeled on the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding.91
The DSM created by the 1996 Protocol was a significant step for
the evolution of ASEAN’s legal framework. Under the 1996 Protocol, when an economic dispute arose, and bilateral negotiations and
mediation attempts had failed, the dispute was to be referred to the
Senior Economic Officials Meeting (“SEOM”).92 The SEOM was
then to convene a panel of experts to do the relevant fact-finding.93
The SEOM’s decision only required a simple majority and not unanimity.94 As Davidson notes, the 1996 Protocol’s DSM was quite significant as it was “the first formal use of non-consensual decisionmaking in ASEAN.”95

86. Rules of Procedure of the High Council of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia (Jul. 23, 2001), ASEAN, available at http://www.aseansec.org/3639.htm. (last
visited Nov. 3, 2005).
87. See id.
88. PAUL J. DAVIDSON, ASEAN: THE EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION 147 (2002).
89. Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Nov. 20, 1996), ASEAN, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/16654.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
90. Id. at Preamble.
91. DAVIDSON, supra note 88, at 147.
92. See Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism, supra note 89, art. 4.
93. Id. arts. 4-7.
94. Id. art. 7.
95. DAVI DSON, supra note 88, at 148.
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The 1996 Protocol even allowed for appellate review of SEOM
decisions by the ASEAN Economic Ministers.96 However, the DSM
created by the 1996 Protocol was never invoked. When explaining
why this DSM was never used, ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng
Yong has stated, “the 1996 Protocol was perceived to be ineffective
because of its excessive bureaucratic nature, and thus it had never
been invoked.”97
Consequently, in 2004, ASEAN created a new Protocol: the
ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism98
(“2004 Protocol”). One of the key differences between the two Protocols is that under the 2004 Protocol, both government and nongovernment officials are involved in resolving the dispute.99
Moreover, rather than appellate review by the ASEAN Economic Ministers, under the 2004 Protocol, appellate review is conducted by experts that are not associated with any government.100
The purpose of this change according to Secretary-General Ong is to
settle “trade and economic disputes through objective assessment instead of bureaucratic negotiation.”101 However, the appellate body
still lacked terms of reference to guide their decision-making.102 Nevertheless, the move of distancing dispute resolution from diplomacy is
a significant step in the direction of legalism, and stands in direct contrast to the 1996 Protocol.
Another significant change introduced by the 2004 Protocol was
the creation of the “Consultation to Solve Trade and Investment Issues.” The avowed purpose of this body is to “handle complaints of
the private sector and operational problems encountered in the implementation of ASEAN economic agreements.”103 As of March
2005, ASEAN was also trying to create an “ASEAN Compliance
Body.”104 The purpose of this body would be to “perform a quasi-

96. Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism, supra note 86, art. 8.
97. Ong, supra note 69.
98. ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Nov. 29, 2004),
ASEAN, available at http://www.aseansec.org/16754.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2005).
99. See id. art. 12.
100. Id.
101. Ong, supra note 69.
102. This was the case in March 2005.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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judicial function by issuing findings and opinions on non-compliance
in respect of subject matter before it.”105
In short, the implementation of DSM is critical to the development of an ASEAN legal framework. In particular, a strong dispute
resolution mechanism is essential if ACFTA is to succeed. While the
DSM created by the 2004 Protocol is a significant improvement over
the 1996 version, the reader must not forget that ASEAN’s new DSM
still lacks necessary implementing regulations, and most importantly,
remains untested.
Aside from the still developing DSM, there other indicators that
ASEAN has yet to fully embrace legalism. In particular, the pivotal
security agreement—the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea—remains a non-binding document. In a 2004
China-ASEAN academic forum, the Chinese participants suggested
that they were willing to create a binding code of conduct.106 Yet, it
was the ASEAN members who resisted such legal development:
“some ASEAN countries are not ready for such a Code of Conduct,
fearing that it might be ‘too legalistic.’”107 Consequently, as Ralf
Emmers suggests, the current Declaration is essentially “an interim
accord.”108 The fear is that ASEAN and China may never be able to
agree to a legally -binding code of conduct regarding the South China
Sea.109
Moreover, Deborah Haas has identified as an impediment to the
development of an ASEAN legal regime the fact that the ASEAN
states have varying domestic legal systems: some civil law, some common law, and some a hybrid of both legal traditions.110 A further hurdle to ASEAN’s legal reform is the reality that some ASEAN me mbers—particularly Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia—are still in the
process of establishing a national legal system and finding a legal

105. Id.
106. DEVELOPING ASEAN-CHINA R ELATIONS: R EALITIES AND PROSPECTS—A BRIEF
R EPORT ON THE ASEAN CHINA FORUM 36 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2004).
107. Id.
108. Ralf Emmers, Keeping Waters Calm in South China Sea, STRAITS TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002,
at 23.
109. Id.
110. Deborah Haas, Note, Out of Others’ Shadows: ASEAN Moves Toward Greater Regional Cooperation in the Face of the EC and NAFTA, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. POL’Y 809, 862
(1994).
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identity.111 Other impediments include “differences in colonial backgrounds, language, culture, religion, [and] political systems.”112
IV. THE INTRA-ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA (AFTA) AND
THE RESULTING LEGAL DEVELOPMENT
In 1967, when ASEAN was created, trade among the member
nations was minimal. The ASEAN founding fathers never spoke
about regional “economic integration.”113 Thus, some of the earliest
economic agreements were aimed at increasing intra-ASEAN trade.
In particular, in 1977, ASEAN attempted to develop an intraASEAN free trade area with the establishment of the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements (“PTAs”).114 As Mohammad Ariff
has described, the PTAs adopted a “cumbersome item-by-item approach” to reducing trade ba rriers.115 Consequently, the PTAs failed
to create free trade amongst the Southeast Asian nations because the
flexible provisions resulted in each country developing lengthy exclusion lists.116 Instead of free trade, the PTAs created “a rather comical
free trade in snow plows and other Southeast Asian nonessentials.”117
Twenty years after the PTAs had been created only five percent of
intra-ASEAN trade was subject to the reduced tariffs.118 In fact, a
1987 study of the PTAs revealed that intra-ASEAN trade actua lly
dropped since the PTAs introduction.119
Meanwhile, during the 1980s and early 1990s, ASEAN shifted
some of its attention away from creating its own free trade area to

111. George O. White, III, Note, From Snowplows to Siopao—Trying to Compete in a
Global Ma rketplace: The ASEAN Free Trade Area, 8 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 177, 192
(2000).
112. Haas, supra note 106, at 862-63.
113. Mohamed Ariff, Trade, Investment and Interdependence, in R EINVENTING ASEAN 45,
46 (Simon S.C. Tay, et al. eds., 2001).
114. The PTAs were created by the Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements (Feb. 24, 1977), ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/1376.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2005).
115. Ariff, supra note 113, at 47.
116. Id.
117. White, supra note 111, at 184.
118. Michael Haas, ASEAN’s Pivotal Role in Asian-Pacific Regional Cooperation, 3
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 329, 331 (1997).
119. Juanjai Ajanant, The ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, in ASEAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT: IMPLICATIONS & FUTURE DIRECTIONS 13, 15 (Kao Kim Hourn & Sarah Kanter
eds., 1997).

07_GREENWALD .DOC

210

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

3/1/2006 12:53 PM

[Vol 16:193

participation in the GATT and Uruguay Round negotiations.120
However, after the Uruguay Round, ASEAN began to tackle the issue of free trade once again. As Michael Haas suggests, the combined effect of Europe’s Maastrict Treaty in 1991 and the 1992 North
American Free Trade Agreement left ASEAN worrying about the
access to Western markets.121 ASEAN began to feel that it would
need to create a similar regime in order to compete in the global
marketplace. In particular, ASEAN’s leaders were concerned that:
“they were being bypassed by their relaxed approach to regional cooperation.”122
In 1992, ASEAN adopted the Framework Agreement on Enhancing Economic Cooperation123 (“AFTA Framework Agreement”). The AFTA Framework Agreement was adopted at the 1992
Singapore Summit after the completion of a study analyzing the potential for deeper economic cooperation among the ASEAN member
states. As the full name of the AFTA Framework Agreement suggests, the document does not set out detailed implementing instructions but rather is a general framework listing plans for deepening
economic cooperation among the ASEAN states. Article 2(A) is the
most relevant provision of this Framework Agreement as it contains
the plan to create an intra-ASEAN Free Trade Area (“AFTA”).124
While the Framework Agreement sets out the basic policies for
further economic cooperation, the mechanism for actually achieving
AFTA is the “Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Ta riff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area” (“CEPT Scheme”).
When created, AFTA and the CEPT Scheme called for the reduction
of tariff rates to between zero and five percent by 2008. The target
date was later pushed up to 2003 and then again to 2002. According
to ASEAN, as of 2004, the six original CEPT members had met this
goal with respect to more than 99% of the products on the CEPT in-

120. H. S. Kartadjoemena, ASEAN and the International Trading System: Regional Trade
Arrangement vs. the WTO, in ASEAN BEYOND THE R EGIONAL CRISIS: CHALLENGES AND
INITIATIVES 203, 218 (Mya Than ed., 2001).
121. Haas, supra note 118, at 331.
122. Id.
123. Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation (Jan. 28, 1992),
ASEAN, available at http://www.aseansec.org/1165.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2005).
124. Id. art. 2(a)(1).
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clusion list.125 The newest members of ASEAN are still in process of
implementing the CEPT scheme and have varying target dates.126
Although ASEAN’s official website promotes AFTA as a success,127 other scholars have described ASEAN’s progress towards
AFTA as a “struggle.”128 As Peofilo C. Daquila notes, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 was particularly problematic for AFTA, as it
distracted the ASEAN countries from implementing their AFTA obligations.129 Hence, because Singapore became frustrated by the pace
of AFTA, it began to seek out its FTAs with non-ASEAN countries.130
One of the reasons that the realization of AFTA has been slow is
that compliance with tariff reductions has consistently been achieved
through bargaining processes and the ratification of new protocols.
Thus, while the slow pace of AFTA has been frustrating to certain
ASEAN member nations, the process suggests that ASEAN is indeed
moving towards greater legal institutionalization. In particular, since
1995, AFTA-related protocols have become more legalistic, formal,
and detailed. 131
V. KEY GEOPOLITICAL HURDLES TO ACFTA’S SUCCESS
A. Lack of Cohesion in ASEAN
In the few years since the ACFTA plan was unveiled, the
ASEAN states have indicated that they may not be ready for such a
legal agreement because of their continued inability to function as a
unit. At a 2004 China-ASEAN academic forum, some scholars noted
that ASEAN needed to “better synchronize its moves towards
[ACFTA] or CAFTA.”132 Indeed, the inability of the ASEAN states
125. ASEAN, TRADE, available at http://www.aseansec.org/12021.htm (last visited Nov. 3,
2005).
126. Id. Because they joined ASEAN later, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia have
later target dates. Vietnam’s target date is 2006, Laos’ and Myanmar’s is 2008, while Cambodia
has until 2010.
127. See generally Official Website of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, AFTA,
http://www.aseansec.org/12025.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
128. Peofilo C. Daquila & Le Huu Huy, Singapore and ASEAN in the Global Economy: The
Case of Free Trade Agreements, ASIAN SURV. 908, 912 (2003).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. HELEN E. S. N ESADURAI , GLOBALISATION, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND R EGIONALISM:
THE ASEAN F REE TRADE AREA 163-64 (2003).
132. Kesavapany, supra note 12, at 26.
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to negotiate the EHP tariff reductions multilaterally does not bode
well for their future ability to function multilaterally.
Moreover, ASEAN’s inability to negotiate as a single body with
China on other matters may prove to be problematic for ACFTA.
For example, as described earlier, with respect to the Spratly Islands
dispute, one of the reasons China and ASEAN were not able to develop a legally -binding code of conduct but instead adopted a political
declaration is because the ASEAN members could not work collectively.133 Because the ASEAN members were not able to reach consensus with respect to the dispute, ASEAN as an organization was
weakened in negotiations with China.134
The Spratly Islands dispute certainly differs from ACFTA to the
extent that not all ASEAN me mbers have legal claims to the Spratly
islands; hence since the ASEAN members’ interests in the dispute
vary significantly, China has been able to divide up the ASEAN
members and negotiate bilaterally. However, the importance of
ACFTA to each ASEAN member may differ significantly according
to its state of development and export structure. Hence, for ACFTA
to be most effective, and so that ASEAN has sufficient weight at the
bargaining table, the ASEAN members must work collectively toward the goal of establishing ACFTA.
B. Competition between ASEAN and China
If from an economic viewpoint China and ASEAN are primarily
competitors, ACFTA may prove unsuccessful. At a 2004 ChinaASEAN academic forum, one Thai participant noted “[t]he economic
initiatives of China cannot erase the fact that China and most of the
ASEAN states are competitors in the export market.”135
Some scholars have suggested that the competitive nature of the
ASEAN-Chinese relationship is demonstrated by the reality that
China and ASEAN are not each other’s major export markets.136 As
John Wong and Sarah Chan articulate, the export levels between
China and ASEAN suggest that their trade structures are fundamentally competitive rather than complementary. Both sides are economically oriented toward the industrialized countries of the West

133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Emmers, supra note 108.
Kesavapany, supra note 12, at 30.
See, e.g., Wong & Chen, supra note 20, at 517.
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and Japan.”137 The United States remains ASEAN’s main trading
partner. In 2001, while trade between ASEAN and China was $55.4
billion, trade between ASEAN nations and the United States was
$120 billion. 138 Hence, as Vincent Wei-cheng Wang writes, “although
increasing trade and investment ties have increased the economic interdependence between China and ASEAN, these relationships are
still trailing the region’s economic relationships with the United
States, although the gap is narrowing.”139
Therefore, because the ASEAN and Chinese economies are not
“complementary,” the ASEAN member states will compete with
China for exports to developed countries. This competition may occur for both traditional and non-traditional manufactured goods.140
Furthermore, tensions between ASEAN and China have increased due to the perception that China is diverting investment away
from ASEAN. “Although the decline of ASEAN-bound FDI [Foreign Direct Investment] has been overstated, the perception in
Southeast Asia is nevertheless that FDI is having a ‘hollow out effect’
and this perception has contributed to a growing sense of threat
across much of the Southeast Asian region.”141 In 2002, China’s FDI
inflows reached $53 billion, while all of the ASEAN members combined received only $14 billion. 142
VI. ACFTA, THE WTO, THE UNITED STATES, AND JAPAN
A. ACFTA and the WTO
In theory, ACFTA is intended to be WTO-consistent.143 Within
the ACFTA Framework Agreement, there are eight references to the

137. Id.
138. Wang, supra note 3, at 31.
139. Id.
140. Wong & Chen, supra note 20, at 519-21 (“In the area of traditional labor-extensive industries like textiles, clothing, and footwear, China’s gains have come at the expense of
ASEAN.”). Authors also note that in the area of non-traditional and more capital intensivemanufactures such as manufacturers of computers, printers, disk drives etc., ASEAN has been
negatively impacted by the growth of exports of these non-traditional goods from China to the
world market. See id.
141. Kesavapany , supra note 12, at 30.
142. Denis Hew, Regional Economic Trends, in ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2004-2005 46, 47 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005).
143. Yu, supra note 21, at 54 (“In theory, any WTO member’s regulations and state activ ities rela ting to trade have to comply with WTO rules.”).
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WTO.144 However, ACFTA is also symbolic of a growing movement
toward regionalism that is seemingly at odds with the WTO/GATTled international trading system. As Wang Jiang Yu notes: “By definition, regionalism is at odd[s] with the MFN clause and the draftsmen of the GATT and WTO were aware of this; they created several
exceptions for RTAs [regional trading agreements].”145
Moreover, some scholars have suggested that ACFTA’s technical
compliance with the WTO rules is not surprising since generally
RTAs (regional trade arrangements) are WTO-consistent.146 As at
least one commentator has noted, RTAs are usually found to be consistent because “the requirements of Article XXIV and the Enabling
Clause and GATS are very weak and have never been enforced.”147
Indeed, the resurgence of regionalism itself ma y demonstrate the
many weaknesses of the current WTO multilateral trading system.
The failure of global trade talks in the past couple of years has arguably led to the recent proliferation of negotiations for bilateral and regional free trade agreements. Even the United States has sought out
new FTAs.148 However, merely because many powerful nations are
negotiating FTAs does not mean that the WTO has become insignificant. Furthermore, because ACFTA’s success is far from guaranteed,
and because the WTO still provides many benefits that ACFTA likely
cannot provide, China and ASEAN must ensure that ACFTA is a
“building block” and not a “stumbling block” with respect to the
WTO.149
Meanwhile, even if ACFTA and China’s newfound embracement
of regionalism is not a direct threat to the WTO, ACFTA’s creation
will likely significantly affect the world trading system. Even before
the creation of ACFTA, scholars noted ASEAN’s potential to con-

144. See Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Between
ASEAN and People’s Republic of China, supra note 26, arts. 1-3, 7-9, 11-12, 14. Additionally,
one of the paragraphs of the Preamble states, “REAFFIRMING the rights, obligations and undertakings of the respective parties under the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and other
multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements and arrangements.”
145. Yu, supra note 21, at 55.
146. See id. for comments regarding regional trading agreements and their compliance with
WTO rules.
147. Id.
148. Most notable is the July 2005 passage of the Central American Free Trade Agreement.
149. Sellakumaran, supra note 34, at 52-54; see also Yu, supra note 21, at 68 (noting that
leading trade powers such as China have the responsibility to ensure that regionalism serves as
“building blocks” for multilateral trade liberalization).
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siderably influence WTO and GATT negotiations in future years.150
Moreover, with China’s rising economic status and recent entry to the
WTO, WTO-watchers should anticipate seeing China significantly influence the making of WTO rules in years to come.151 Furthermore,
keeping in mind China’s interest in influencing the making of WTO
rules, the desirability of ACFTA is more evident: “by embracing an
FTA, China is anticipating that ASEAN in the ACFTA will lend support to China in rule-making. In other words, the ACFTA is expected to enhance China’s balancing power in the making of rules in
international fora.”152
B. ACFTA’s impact on the United States and Japan
There is little doubt that the United States and other economic
powers with significant influence in East Asia will be affected as
China gains more influence over ASEAN through ACFTA: “[t]he
pact between regional giant China and the [ten] nations aims to drop
most tariffs over the next five years in a move some analysts have said
is a sign Beijing may be moving to undercut America’s vast influence
over the region.”153
Japan, as another superpower with considerable influence in
East Asia, has already taken concrete action in response to ACFTA.
Even before ACFTA officially commenced in July 2005, the plan for
ACFTA prompted Japan to seek a closer relationship with
ASEAN.154 As indicated in a recent Japanese editorial, Japan’s response to ACFTA has been to act quickly out of fear of being edged
out by China.155 In a July 19, 2005 editorial in The Daily Yoimuri, a
Tokyo-based newspaper, the commentator noted that Japan “should
do all it can to make progress in FTA talks with ASEAN nations.”156
150. See, e.g., Thomas Fischer, A Commentary on Regional Institutions in the Pacific Rim:
Do APEC and ASEAN Still Matter? , 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 337, 379 (2003).
151. Qingjiang Kong, supra note 5, at 845 (“In a nutshell, China has voiced the following
approaches to WTO rules: honouring its own commitments, using WTO rules to its own advantage, and actively participating in the making of new rules.”)
152. Id.
153. CNN, New Zealand Looks at ASEAN Security Treaty , Dec. 1, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/12/01/laos.asean/index.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2005).
154. Wang, supra note 3, at 35 (noting that the ACFTA is causing some concerns in Japan,
which has led to a new emphasis on developing a closer relationship with ASEAN. As Wang
states, “Interestingly, some analysts view Japan’s new emphasis on fostering closer relations
with ASEAN as being driven by one major consideration—not to be outdone by China.”).
155. Japan Needs Trade Pact with ASEAN, DAILY Y OMIURI , July 19, 2005, at 4.
156. Id.
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CONCLUSION
As highlighted in Part IV, the long-term success of ACFTA will
depend on ASEAN’s ability to adopt more legalistic measures, particularly an enhanced dispute settlement mechanism. While the 2004
Protocol is a significant step in the development of an ASEAN DSM,
it is too early to judge whether it will be sufficiently more successful
than the ASEAN DSM created under the 1996 Protocol. As the
reader will recall, the DSM was never utilized under the 1996 Protocol. Hence, ASEAN’s significant inexperience with a DSM could
prove to be problematic for the success of ACFTA, which will require
a sufficiently institutionalized DSM. Moreover, not only has
ASEAN’s development of its own DSM been slow, but the ASEAN
states who are members of the WTO have been relatively inactive in
using the WTO dispute settlement system.157 Whether or not this is
the result of a persistent reluctance towards using legalistic approaches or is due to other unrelated factors, overall the ASEAN
members are novices with respect to international economic dispute
settlement systems.
In contrast, the development of an intra-ASEAN free trade area
described in Part V bodes well for the future success of ACFTA. The
progress already made with this intra-ASEAN free trade area de monstrates that six of the ASEAN states are capable of reducing tariffs
in line with required targets. However, because the four newer
ASEAN members were not required to fully implement the intraASEAN free trade area in the same timeframe as the elder members,
it is too early to judge whether these less-developed nations will be
able to maintain their commitment to free trade.
Regardless of whether ACFTA succeeds in the long-term,
ASEAN’s and China’s commitment to this endeavour is significant.
In particular, if there is one lesson to be derived from the ACFTA
experience it is how China’s economic rise has the potential to profoundly affect other nations’ legal development. Whether or not
ACFTA is, as some have suggested, the only method for dealing with
China’s ascendancy, it is clear that ASEAN has recognized the pressing nature of the “China question” and is responding to it through
economic, geopolitical, and, most importantly, related legal reform.
Indeed, ACFTA can also be seen as China’s legal response to its
157. See Nohyoung Park, Overview of the State of WTO Dispute Settlement Involving the
ASEAN+3, in WTO AND EAST ASIA : N EW PERSPECTIVES 241, 244 (Mitsuo Matsushita & Dukgeun Ahn eds., 2004).

07_GREENWALD .DOC

2006]

3/1/2006 12:53 PM

THE ASEAN- CHINA FREE TRADE AREA

217

growing economic prowess both as a method of engaging its
neighbours in a “win-win situation” and as a means to influence the
formation of international economic rules. What remains to be seen,
however, is how other nations such as the United States will respond
to China as it continues to grow as an economic superpower.

